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Abstract 
 
 
We estimate the value added by sell-side equity research analysts and explore the links between 
analyst research, informational efficiency, and asset prices. We identify the value of research 
from exogenous changes in analyst coverage. On announcement that a stock has lost all 
coverage, share prices fall by around 110 basis points or $8.4 million on average. The share price 
reaction is attenuated the more analysts continue to cover the stock, suggesting that there are 
diminishing returns to coverage at the margin. The adverse effect of coverage terminations is 
proportional to the analyst’s reputation and experience and to the size of the broker’s retail sales 
force. Exogenous reductions in coverage are followed by: less efficient pricing and lower 
liquidity; greater earnings surprises and more volatile trading around subsequent earnings 
announcements; increases in required returns; and reduced return volatility. Simulations suggest 
investors can trade profitably on the volatility changes. Finally, retail investors sell and large 
institutional investors buy around coverage terminations, suggesting that different investor 
clienteles have different demands for analyst research.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Key words: Sell-side research; Coverage terminations; Informational efficiency; Trading 
strategies; Global Settlement. 
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Information is the lifeblood of financial markets. To learn about firm-specific or common factors 
affecting stock prices, investors buy analysis from information producers, ranging from the Wall 
Street Journal to investment newsletters and sell-side equity research departments at brokerage 
houses. In this paper, we estimate the value added by equity research analysts and explore the links 
between analyst research, informational efficiency, and asset prices.  
Whether analysts add much value is controversial. Some view analyst research as an important 
channel through which information is impounded in stock prices (see, for instance, Grossman and 
Stiglitz (1980) and Gleason and Lee (2003)). Others view analysts mainly as “cheerleaders” for 
companies, who produce biased research in the hope of currying favor with executives (see, for 
instance, James and Karceski (2006)). The empirical evidence suggests analyst research does 
convey information, in the sense that recommendation changes can move prices (Womack (1996), 
Barber et al. (2001), and Jegadeesh et al. (2004)). But this leaves open the question whether analyst 
research is a zero-sum game (one investor’s gain is another investor’s loss), or whether analysts 
create value over and above trading gains.  
How might analyst research create value? Suppose the assumptions of the Gordon growth model 
hold. Then, )/( grDP −= , where P is the stock price, D is the future dividend, r is the discount 
rate, and g is the dividend growth rate. For analyst research to affect stock prices, it must affect 
either r or g. One channel through which it may affect r is informational efficiency: If analyst 
research makes a stock more informationally efficient and thus more liquid, trading costs and hence 
r may fall (Amihud and Mendelson (1986)). Analyst research may also have real consequences. 
Greater information production may, for instance, lead to better monitoring of managers. This, in 
turn, could increase g and so firm value. Similarly, it may affect the cost of external funds and 
hence the firm’s ability to optimally invest in positive NPV projects. 
In this paper, we focus on the asset pricing consequences of analyst research, leaving an 
examination of the potential real consequences to future work. We identify the value and function 
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of analyst research from exogenous variation in the supply of research caused by recent structural 
changes in the U.S. equity research industry. Our tests show that as brokerage firms reduce analyst 
coverage, share prices fall; that these falls are permanent; that informational efficiency and liquidity 
decrease; that the required return r increases; and that firm-specific volatility decreases.  
Stocks are constantly added to and dropped from brokers’ coverage lists. As McNichols and 
O’Brien (1997) observe, coverage changes are usually endogenous. Initiations may reflect an 
analyst’s positive opinion of a company’s future performance, resulting in large abnormal returns 
(e.g., Demiroglu and Ryngaert (2005)). Terminations, in contrast, are often viewed as implicit sell 
recommendations. The resulting share price fall may hence reflect the revelation of an analyst’s 
negative view of a firm’s prospects rather than the effects of reduced research coverage. Similarly, 
an analyst may drop a stock because institutional investors have lost interest in the stock (Xu 
(2006)). If institutional interest correlates with informational efficiency, we may find a spurious 
correlation between coverage terminations and decreases in efficiency. 
To avoid these biases, we construct a set of coverage terminations that are the result of 
brokerage firms downsizing their research operations in response to adverse changes in the 
economics of producing research in the early 2000s. At least 20 firms quit the research business 
altogether. FleetBoston, for example, closed its Robertson Stephens unit in July 2002, with a loss of 
more than 40 analyst positions and coverage terminations on nearly 600 stocks. Other brokers 
reduced headcount, often drastically. To illustrate, on May 23, 2003, Citigroup dropped coverage of 
eight of the 43 sectors its analysts had covered.1 We identify more than a thousand instances of 
brokerage firms terminating sector coverage between 2000 and 2005.  
Sell-side research was downsized because market developments and new regulations had 
undermined its business model. While producing research is expensive, it does not generate any 
direct revenue, as few brokers charge investors directly for their research. Instead, research is 
                                                          
1 The eight affected sectors were metals/mining, life sciences, utilities, healthcare services, airlines, industrials, specialty 
chemicals, and telecom equipment/wireless. 
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funded through cross-subsidies from trading, market-making, or investment banking. Each of these 
revenue streams diminished in the early 2000s. The prolonged decline in trading volumes that 
accompanied the bear market of 2000-2003 reduced brokerage revenue and income from market-
making activities. And since the 2003 Global Settlement, investment banking has been prohibited 
from cross-subsidizing research, in an effort to protect investors from conflicts of interest.2  
As sell-side research declined, buy-side research expanded. Yet buy-side research is proprietary; 
it is not shared with other investors. So while the net amount of information produced may not have 
changed, information is now more unequally distributed, to the possible detriment of those whose 
marginal cost of producing substitute research is high (such as small institutions or retail investors). 
Our sample contains 16,253 coverage terminations over the period 2000-2005. Are they 
plausibly exogenous? First, we note that all results (with one minor exception) are robust to 
restricting the sample to the 1,792 terminations caused by brokerage closures. Such closures are 
very unlikely to correlate with variables of interest, such as performance. Sector terminations, on 
the other hand, might, but we find no evidence that brokers’ choice of which sectors to drop reflect 
either prior or future performance. Finally, we show that sample terminations appear to carry no 
information about future operating performance, unlike a control group of endogenous terminations. 
We find that reductions in the supply of information have a direct, adverse effect on asset prices. 
Cumulative abnormal returns average minus 47 basis points on the day of an exogenous coverage 
termination, increasing to minus 64 basis points by day +3. This effect appears to be permanent: 
There is no bounce back over the first month of trading, and over the next six to 24 months, 
terminated stocks perform in line with risk and style benchmarks. Thus, we find no evidence that 
the market over- or underreacts to coverage terminations. 
The market reaction is strongest among the 838 sample stocks that lose all analyst coverage. On 
                                                          
2 Analysts may come under pressure to publish biased research to please investment banking clients (Michaely and 
Womack (1999), Dugar and Nathan (1995), Lin and McNichols (1998)), to boost commissions (Irvine (2004), Jackson 
(2005), Agrawal and Chen (2004), Cowen, Groysberg, and Healy (2006)), or to curry favor with company managers 
(Francis and Philbrick (1993), Das, Levine, and Sivaramakrishnan (1998), Lim (2001)). 
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average, orphaning a stock reduces its share price by around 110 basis points on announcement, 
equivalent to an $8.4 million reduction in market value. This provides an estimate of the capitalized 
value that sell-side research can add. The share price reaction around terminations is attenuated the 
more analysts continue to cover the stock, suggesting there are diminishing returns to producing 
information at the margin. It is more negative the more experienced the analyst, which hints at 
heterogeneity in the quality of information produced. Finally, the larger the brokerage firm’s retail 
sales force, the more negative is the market’s reaction. 
Coverage terminations are accompanied by abnormally high trading volumes as investors 
rebalance their portfolios. Moreover, using CDA/Spectrum data, we show that institutional 
investors are unusually large net buyers in the quarter of a termination announcement, and 
especially when coverage drops to zero. By implication, the net sellers are individual investors and 
institutions without a duty to file 13f reports. One interpretation of these patterns is that individual 
investors and smaller institutions are more dependent on sell-side analyst research, so a coverage 
termination may reduce their valuation and hence their demand for the stock.  
Changes in informational efficiency following coverage drops support this interpretation. Using 
difference-in-difference tests to control for secular and unrelated trends over the sample period, we 
show that three popular measures of informational efficiency, the probability of informed trading 
(PIN), Amihud’s (2002) illiquidity measure, and Lo and MacKinlay’s (1988) variance ratios, 
deteriorate following exogenous coverage terminations. Moreover, these reductions in informational 
efficiency are associated with more volatile returns around subsequent earnings announcements and 
with greater earnings surprises. As coverage is reduced, the average magnitude of earnings surprises 
increases by 16.9% compared to style-matched control firms whose coverage remains unchanged.  
Deterioration in informational efficiency and liquidity is associated with changes in investors’ 
required returns. Using standard factor models, we show that factor loadings change to produce an 
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increase of seven basis points in average required returns. The direction of the change is consistent 
with share prices falling around exogenous coverage terminations. Moreover, the magnitude of the 
change is commensurate with our point estimates of the announcement-day share price falls. 
Roll (1988) views high firm-specific volatility as evidence of active trading by informed 
arbitrageurs who ensure that stock prices closely reflect fundamental value. If this is correct, we 
expect volatility to fall following exogenous coverage terminations, and it does. Controlling for the 
fact that volatility has trended down over the sample period, our difference-in-difference estimates 
range from minus 1.39 to minus 1.85 volatility points. When we simulate trading strategies (using 
zero-beta straddles or butterflies) designed to capitalize on these changes in volatility, we find that 
they are profitable, both economically and statistically. Trading at the bid and ask to allow for 
trading costs, our simulations suggest that shorting straddles following coverage terminations yields 
average daily returns of 1.36%, or 0.27% more per day than an equivalent position in options on 
style-matched control firms whose coverage remains unchanged. 
Our paper is related to four contemporaneous studies that also analyze changes in analyst 
coverage. The paper closest in spirit to ours is Hong and Kacperczyk (2007). Like us, these authors 
exploit exogenous variation in coverage (in their case, variation due to mergers among brokerage 
firms with overlapping coverage universes), though their focus is different. Their main finding is 
that reductions in coverage are followed by an increase in forecast optimism bias. They interpret 
this finding as evidence of competition among analysts mitigating a tendency to produce biased 
research. Kecskes and Womack (2007) focus on investor overreactions to (presumably mostly 
endogenous) changes in the number of analysts covering a stock. Increases (decreases) in covering 
intensity in their sample are associated with lower (higher) future returns. Khorana, Mola, and Rau 
(2007) examine the causes of complete loss of analyst coverage. By design, they focus on 
endogenous coverage terminations, finding that small, poorly performing, highly leveraged 
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companies at high risk of bankruptcy are more likely to lose coverage. Loss of coverage is followed 
by a higher incidence of involuntary delisting, suggesting that analysts in their sample dropped 
coverage in part due to foreknowledge of impending distress. Finally, Scherbina (2007) reports 
evidence that analysts with negative signals about future earnings terminate coverage rather than 
lowering their earnings forecasts, in line with the arguments in McNichols and O’Brien (1997). 
Our contribution is threefold. First, we identify a source of variation that gives rise to exogenous 
changes in the supply of information in the stock market. We believe this can serve as a useful 
instrument for empirical work in either asset pricing or corporate finance that examines questions of 
asymmetric information. Second, we provide a quantitative estimate of the value of sell-side 
research. At a time when the sell-side research business model is in flux, estimates of the value 
added by analysts may provide a basis for business model innovation. Third, we quantify the 
relation between analyst coverage on the one hand and liquidity and informational efficiency on the 
other, both of which are important considerations in asset pricing and portfolio formation.  
I. Sample and Data 
A. Sample Construction 
We use several sources to construct a dataset of coverage terminations, and then impose filters 
to arrive at a set of terminations that can plausibly be treated as exogenous. From Reuters Estimates, 
we obtain a coverage table with precise coverage start and end dates for each broker/analyst/ticker 
combination. Defining a coverage termination as the absence of a reinitiation within two months3 of 
an end date, there are 64,596 terminations in the Reuters table over the period January 1, 2000 to 
December 31, 2005. However, Reuters does not identify why a broker dropped a stock. Most drops 
are likely firm-specific, i.e., endogenous. Tellingly, the 64,596 Reuters terminations typically affect 
only a minority of an analyst’s coverage universe, suggesting that they are the result of a 
realignment of coverage in response to firm-specific information.  
                                                          
3 This is conservative. Brokers tend to reinitiate within ten days (usually following black-out periods) or not at all.  
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A.1 Sector Terminations and Brokerage Closures  
We conjecture that sector terminations (as opposed to changes in firm coverage within a sector) 
are likely exogenous. We test this conjecture in Section II. As sector definitions vary by broker, we 
define sectors using six-digit GICS codes.4 Between 2000 and 2005, Reuters has 770 instances of a 
brokerage firm terminating coverage of an entire sector on a single day. This will understate sector 
terminations if GICS do not coincide precisely with a given broker’s sector definition.5 To allow for 
this, we define a sector termination as any instance of a brokerage firm dropping coverage of at 
least 75% of the stocks it covered in a GICS sector. This yields a further 376 sector drops.  
A subset of these 1,146 sector terminations relate to closures of research departments at 20 
brokerage firms, ranging from large firms like Robertson Stephens and Wells Fargo to small outfits 
like IRG Research and J.B. Hanauer & Co. Collectively, the 1,146 sector terminations account for 
11,504 terminations of stock coverage; 1,792 of these are due to brokerage closures.6  
A.2 Termination Announcements and Termination Notices 
We augment the 11,504 terminations from Reuters with 11,592 cases identified from other 
sources in which brokers disclose a reason for the termination.7 First, we search in Factiva and 
Bloomberg for announcements of sector terminations not already identified in the Reuters data. This 
yields a further four dropped sectors, taking the total number of sector terminations to 1,150. 
Second, since 2003, brokerage firms have had to explain their coverage termination decisions by 
issuing a termination notice.8 We search for termination notices in three text archives of analyst 
                                                          
4 Bhojraj, Lee, and Oler (2003) compare four industry classifications, concluding that “GICS … are significantly better 
at explaining stock return co-movements, as well as cross-sectional variations in … key financial ratios.”  
5 Suppose some oil & gas stocks (GICS code 101020) are covered by the energy team. If the broker fires the oil & gas 
team but not the energy team, we will observe less than 100% of the oil & gas GICS coverage being terminated. 
6 We treat the 64,596 – 11,504 = 53,092 remaining Reuters terminations as likely endogenous. 
7 Many terminations appear in more than one source. The numbers reported in the text are based on eliminating 
duplicates. In the rare instances where the sources disagree on announcement dates, we choose the earliest one. 
8 NYSE Rule 472(f)(5) and NASD Rule 2711(f)(6) require that “a member provide notice to customers that it is 
terminating research coverage of an issuer that is the subject of a research report. … [I]f the research analyst covering 
the subject company has left the member, or where the member has terminated coverage on an industry or sector … the 
rationale for termination will be required.” See http://www.sec.gov/rules/sro/34-48252.htm. 
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reports (Investext, Thomson One, and the client-intranet of a large brokerage house).9 Termination 
reasons which we categorize as exogenous include: “This decision […] relates to a disruption in 
analyst coverage and is unrelated to any awareness on our part of a change in the fundamental 
condition of the companies.” We ignore termination notices that give endogenous reasons, such as 
“The company no longer fits with our core investment objectives and coverage universe;” “owing to 
potential bankruptcy proceedings;” or “because of the company’s relatively low institutional 
ownership, low retail interest, and low trading volume.” 
Finally, we identify stocks dropped for exogenous reasons from the “upgrades/downgrades” 
service on Dow Jones’s marketwatch.com service, which provides brief summaries of analyst 
reports (including termination notices) along with relevant announcement dates.  
Combining the Reuters, newswire, text archive, and Dow Jones samples, we have 23,096 unique 
candidate events. For each of these, we record the date of the termination announcement, the reason 
for the termination, and the identity of the brokerage house and analyst. We identify the analyst 
covering the stock from the name on the termination notice or the Reuters coverage table where 
available, or else from the I/B/E/S earnings forecast database.  
A.3 Filters 
We filter out 6,843 of the 23,096 candidate events as follows. First, using CRSP delisting codes, 
we remove 434 stocks that were involuntarily delisted from an exchange within 60 days of a 
termination notice. This allows for the possibility that the analyst dropped the stock based on 
foreknowledge of impending distress (Khorana, Mola, and Rau (2007)), and so screens out 
potentially endogenous terminations. Second, to isolate the effects of reduced information 
production, we remove 5,396 terminations that are followed by a reinitiation by the same analyst at 
a new employer, or by a different analyst at the original brokerage firm, within three months of the 
drop. In addition, we exclude 528 REITs, 326 ADRs, 80 non-common stocks and closed-end funds 
                                                          
9 Keywords used include: “Terminate/discontinue/withdraw/suspend/cease/drop/stop coverage”, “Not rated/covered”. 
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(i.e., CRSP share codes > 12), and 79 companies without valid CRSP permno identifiers.  
Our final sample consists of 16,253 coverage terminations, though the sample size will vary 
depending on the availability of variables of interest. It includes 4,150 unique stocks and spans all 
Fama-French industries, 179 brokerage houses, and 1,755 analysts. There were 1,955 terminations 
in 2000, 1,783 in 2001, 3,864 in 2002, 2,976 in 2003, 2,736 in 2004, and 2,939 in 2005. 
How frequent are exogenous terminations relative to endogenous ones? The Reuters coverage 
table described earlier has 64,596 terminations. Not every broker contributes data to Reuters, so we 
add 52,869 additional terminations from the I/B/E/S database.10 This suggests that around one in 
seven terminations was exogenous over the 2000-2005 period (16,253/(64,596+52,869)). 
B. Descriptive and Summary Statistics 
Figure 1 plots smoothed histograms for the average number of days between sample 
terminations, estimated by broker or by stock using a kernel density estimator. Sample terminations 
clearly cluster at the broker level: For a given broker, the majority of drops occurs in a small time 
window (mean=12.3 trading days). This reflects the fact that brokerage houses terminated coverage 
of many stocks at the same time, e.g., when they quit equity research or terminated coverage of one 
or more sectors. At the stock level, on the other hand, the time between sample drops is spread quite 
evenly over a range from a few days to several years (mean=248.8 days). This lack of clustering at 
the stock level is consistent with sample terminations being exogenous: If a stock had been dropped 
by multiple brokers due to negative stock-specific information, we would have expected 
terminations to cluster. Though not shown, we find a similar lack of clustering at the sector level. 
The figure also shows the density of the average number of days by stock between the 53,092 
Reuters non-sector terminations, which we screened out as likely endogenous. These drops cluster 
visibly (mean=141.1 days), suggesting common factors (and so potential endogeneity) in brokers’ 
                                                          
10 These are defined crudely as stocks covered by a broker in one year but not the next, as we lack an I/B/E/S coverage 
table with precise coverage dates. For the same reason, Kecskes and Womack (2007), who use I/B/E/S data, conduct 
their analysis at an annual frequency rather than in event time.  
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decisions to drop coverage on these stocks.  
Table I compares summary statistics for the size, liquidity, and return volatility of the stocks in 
our sample to the CRSP universe of publicly traded U.S. stocks and to the universes of U.S. stocks 
covered by at least one brokerage firm according to Reuters Estimates and I/B/E/S, respectively. 
Sample stocks are on average larger and more liquid than the average stock in the CRSP universe. 
The comparison to the Reuters and I/B/E/S universes shows that this reflects a general tendency 
among analysts to cover larger and more liquid stocks, rather than a characteristic of companies 
experiencing coverage terminations. In addition, sample stocks – like Reuters and I/B/E/S stocks 
more generally – are less volatile than CRSP stocks. On average, 9.5 analysts covered a sample 
stock before a coverage drop, in line with the corresponding averages for the Reuters universe and 
the Reuters-I/B/E/S union. Overall, the average sample firm looks similar to the average firm in the 
Reuters and I/B/E/S databases, in terms of size, liquidity, volatility, and analyst coverage.  
C. Extent of Prior Coverage 
Table II reports a breakdown of the sample by the number of other brokers covering the stock in 
the six months preceding the coverage termination (based on pooling data from Reuters Estimates 
and I/B/E/S). Of the 16,253 sample terminations, 838 stocks were left orphaned following the 
termination, 4,031 were still covered by between 1 and 5 other analysts, 3,783 by between 6 and 10 
others, 2,866 by between 11 and 15, and 4,735 by more than 15 other analysts.  
Orphaned stocks are not necessarily smaller than other stocks that experience coverage 
terminations. The average orphaned stock had a market capitalization of $1.4 billion one month 
before the termination – more than in the next bin ($740.9 million). Only stocks covered by 11-15 
or >15 other analysts are markedly larger on average ($5.4 billion and $22.1 billion, respectively). 
Median market capitalization, on the other hand, increases monotonically in coverage.  
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D. Matching Firms 
We use a series of difference-in-difference (DiD) estimators to test for changes in sample firm 
characteristics around coverage terminations. Difference-in-difference tests are commonly used to 
remove biases due to omitted variables (Ashenfelter and Card (1985)). For instance, informational 
efficiency may change over time due to changes in market architecture or regulations rather than 
due to termination of coverage. The DiD tests compare the change in a variable of interest for 
sample terminations to the contemporaneous change in the same variable for a set of control firms 
matched to have similar characteristics. This removes biases due to secular trends affecting similar 
companies at the same time, such as omitted regulations.  
The control groups consist of firms we expect to behave similarly to the event firms but that are 
themselves unaffected by the event. We follow Daniel et al. (1997), henceforth DGTW, and 
randomly choose as controls for firm i five unique firms in the same size, book-to-market, and 
momentum quintile in the month of June prior to a termination, subject to two conditions: a) 
Control stocks must not have experienced a coverage termination during the estimation window; 
and b) each control stock must have sufficient data to estimate the statistic of interest.11  
Table II shows the size, book-to-market, and momentum quintiles that sample terminations are 
assigned to. Terminated stocks are of average size (mean quintile=3.1), have below-average book-
to-market ratios (mean quintile=2.5), and exhibit average momentum (mean quintile=2.9). When we 
condition on the extent of prior coverage, we again find that the extent of coverage is positively 
related to size. There is no obvious relation to book-to-market or momentum.  
II. Exogeneity  
What sets our analysis apart from contemporaneous studies of the effect of changes in coverage 
is our focus on stocks that are dropped for exogenous reasons. We have argued that only exogenous 
                                                          
11 In our difference-in-difference tests, we lose 1,395 events involving stocks that do not satisfy DGTW’s data 
conditions. We also drop observations with fewer than three viable controls for a given test. Depending on the variable 
of interest and estimation window, the number of observations ranges from around 10,000 to around 14,000. 
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terminations allow us to measure the value and function of analyst research consistently and have 
constructed our sample accordingly.  
Perhaps the strongest evidence that our empirical results are free of endogeneity bias comes 
from the 20 brokerage closures. It is difficult to argue that a brokerage firm decided to quit equity 
research because the future prospects of the companies and sectors it covered were poor. Had 
prospects simply been poor, the brokerage firm could have changed its coverage universe, and 
brokerage firms do so routinely. The decision to quit research must thus reflect considerations that 
are uncorrelated with the future prospects of the affected companies and sectors. By comparing the 
results we obtain in the full sample of 16,253 terminations to those in the subsample of 1,792 
closure-related terminations, we can gauge the success of our identification strategy. Our empirical 
results are very similar in either sample (with one exception, which we will point out later).  
A large part of our sample comes from sector terminations. This could introduce a source of bias 
if brokers systematically chose to drop sectors whose characteristics correlate with variables of 
interest. We therefore investigate the empirical determinants of which sectors a broker chooses to 
drop using a McFadden (1974) choice model. The choice set includes all sectors the broker covers 
at the time of the decision. Brokers are assumed to select those sectors whose termination will 
maximize their expected utility (i.e., profit). Brokers might terminate sectors with poor past or poor 
anticipated performance, those covered by low-quality analysts, or those in which they add little 
value. The model is estimated using probit with or without random brokerage-firm effects. The 
dependent variable equals one if a sector is chosen for termination and zero otherwise.  
Table III reports the results. We find no evidence that brokers chose which sectors to terminate 
based on prior sector performance, whether we focus on market-adjusted returns or earnings 
surprises during the previous four quarters. Nor do brokers appear to be clairvoyant: Their choices 
are unrelated to future sector performance measured over the following four quarters, both in terms 
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of average market-adjusted returns and earnings surprises. These coefficients are not only 
statistically insignificant, they are also economically small, as the marginal effects in the table 
indicate. Instead, brokers are significantly more likely to drop less volatile sectors and those 
covered by few other brokers (in the random-effects specification). Brokers tend to retain sectors 
covered by “all-star” or more experienced analysts. If higher-quality analysts tend to produce more 
valuable research, this implies that our estimates of the value of research will be conservative. 
Finally, we test directly whether terminations signal private information about future prospects 
by analyzing subsequent earnings surprises. Suppose at time t, a broker drops coverage on a stock 
due to negative information about t+1 earnings that is not yet reflected in the consensus earnings 
forecast dated t–1. When earnings are eventually announced, they will fall short of consensus. For 
exogenous terminations, on the other hand, earnings will not disappoint systematically.  
We implement this test in a panel tracking the universe of CRSP companies over the period 
2000Q1 to 2006Q1 (filtering out REITs and companies with share codes greater than 12). The test 
includes the 53,092 non-sector Reuters terminations we filtered out as potentially endogenous 
alongside the 16,253 sample terminations.12 Earnings and forecast data come from I/B/E/S.  
We first analyze earnings surprises (scaled by book value of assets) in a pooled OLS regression. 
Besides indicator variables for the sample and Reuters terminations, we control for lagged earnings 
surprises, share price returns and return volatility measured over the prior 12 months, the log 
number of brokers covering the stock, and year fixed effects. This yields the following estimates: 
companies) (4,148 quarters-firm 629,65           5.84           %6.14 Adj.
                       016. 126.
 . 228. 814.4 466.) L( 364. 
***2 ===
++−
+−+=
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.040.043
.019.370.040.017
 
We report heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors (clustered on CRSP permno) beneath the 
                                                          
12 While there are 3.3 times as many Reuters terminations, they affect only 2.4 times as many firm-quarters as do the 
sample terminations (34.1% vs. 14.0%). As in Figure 1, this reflects the greater degree of clustering among the Reuters 
terminations. 
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coefficient estimates. Earnings surprises are serially correlated, more positive for high-return and 
low-volatility companies and among firms covered by many analysts. Controlling for these effects, 
earnings surprises are significantly more negative following Reuters terminations (p = 0.004). On 
average, a Reuters termination is followed by a quarterly earnings surprise that is 22.4% more 
negative than the sample average over this period. Sample terminations, by contrast, are unrelated to 
subsequent earnings surprises, consistent with our conjecture that they are exogenous.  
The pooled OLS model ignores the panel structure of the data. Given serial correlation, we 
estimate a dynamic panel data model under the assumption that the errors follow an AR(1) process. 
To control for unobserved heterogeneity in firm characteristics, we include firm fixed effects, and 
we allow for unbalanced panels (see Baltagi and Wu (1999)). This yields the following estimates: 
companies) (3,995 quarters-firm 100,62           9.42             304.)(term)1(AR
                         037. 107.
 . 011. 238.2 449. 
*** ===
++−−
−−=
NF
effectsfixedeffectsyearnterminatio exog.utersRe
skerbronovolatilityreturnsurpriseearnings
.047.040
.036.348.024
ρ
 
We continue to find that Reuters terminations, but not sample terminations, correlate with 
subsequent earnings surprises and so appear to be endogenous.13  
III. Price and Volume Patterns 
A. The Value of Research 
How best to quantify the value of sell-side equity research? One possibility is to compare the 
values of companies with and without coverage, though it is hard to hold other determinants of 
value constant in such a cross-sectional comparison. The alternative we propose is to focus on share 
price changes for the same company as the extent of its coverage changes. Over a sufficiently short 
time window, such as a few days, this ensures that other firm characteristics are held constant (as 
                                                          
13 As further evidence of the exogeneity of our sample, we replicate contemporaneous studies. In contrast to Kecskes 
and Womack (2007), sample firms do not underperform in the year before a termination (returning +6.4% above the 
market, compared to –2.7% in Kecskes and Womack). In contrast to Khorana, Mola, and Rau (2007), sample firms are 
not more likely to subsequently delist. And in contrast to Scherbina (2007), sample terminations do not predict negative 
abnormal returns around subsequent earnings announcements. 
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long as we focus on exogenous variation in coverage).  
We compute abnormal returns using two benchmarks (the market model and the Fama-French 
three-factor model) from the close on the day before the termination announcement to the close on 
the announcement day [-1,0], one day later [-1,+1], or three days later [-1,+3]. Table IV reports the 
results. Regardless of benchmark or window, abnormal returns around coverage terminations are 
negative and statistically significant. They range from minus 47 to minus 67 basis points (not 
annualized) and increase somewhat the longer the event window.14 These findings suggest that 
exogenous reductions in coverage reduce firm value and thus that research coverage is valuable.15 
To illustrate the economic magnitude of the capitalized value of research, we multiply a firm’s 
equity market value in the month before a coverage termination by the Fama-French CAR for the [-
1,+1] window. Following a termination, market value declines by around $26.8 million on average, 
$25.9 million if we winsorize 0.5% of observations in each tail, and $1.95 million in the median 
event. Each of these point estimates is statistically significantly different from zero. 
Though not tabulated, the corresponding abnormal returns in the subsample of 1,792 closure-
related terminations average between minus 1.09% and minus 1.53%, depending on benchmark. 
The fact that market reactions are more negative when brokers quit equity research than when they 
selectively terminate sector coverage is consistent with our finding in Table III that brokers tend to 
drop sectors covered by lower-quality analysts. Below, we provide direct evidence that terminations 
involving lower-quality analysts involve smaller (less negative) market reactions.  
Panel B of Table IV reports a breakdown of the CARs by the extent of prior coverage. Both 
economically and statistically, announcement returns are most negative among orphaned stocks. 
                                                          
14 Despite the widespread view that endogenous coverage terminations are implicit sell recommendations, we are not 
aware of studies estimating announcement returns for such implicit sells. For explicit sell recommendations (i.e., 
downgrades to sell), Womack (1996) finds average three-day excess returns of minus 3.87%. 
15 The proviso is that investors realize the terminations are in fact exogenous. If investors mistrust a broker’s stated 
termination reason, the share price falls shown in Table IV may instead capture their mistaken belief that the broker 
possessed negative private information about the affected stocks. However, contrasting terminations for which we have 
termination notices with brokerage closure-related terminations since 2003, we find no significant difference in market 
reaction. 
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These suffer abnormal returns of minus 90 basis points on the event day, minus 108-110 basis 
points by the end of day +1, and minus 131-138 basis points by day +3 (p < 0.001 in each case). 
Economically, this implies a fall in the market value of the average orphaned stock of $8.4 million 
($9.2 million winsorized). CARs are negative and statistically significant in every bin and in nearly 
all specifications increase monotonically (become less negative) the more brokers continue to cover 
a stock. To illustrate, over the [-1,+1] interval, orphaned stocks lose 108 basis points in the market 
model, while stocks covered by more than 15 other analysts lose only 40 basis points. This suggests 
that there are diminishing returns to coverage at the margin. 
In Panel C, we report announcement returns by termination year. While there is some variation 
across years, average CARs are negative in every year and generally statistically significant. The 
largest market reactions occurred in 2002.  
B. Cross-sectional Determinants of the Value of Research 
In Table V, we report the results of OLS regressions with Fama-French CARs as the dependent 
variable. Besides firm fixed effects (using CRSP permnos) and announcement-year effects, we 
control for the extent of coverage by other brokers, analyst quality, and firm size. As in Table IV, 
we find that CARs are positively related to the extent of coverage (see column (1)). All else equal, a 
one-standard deviation decrease in the log number of other brokers covering the stock is associated 
with a 31 basis point lower (more negative) announcement effect. The market appears to react more 
negatively to terminations involving “all-stars” (p=0.055) or more senior analysts (p=0.01), 
confirming our conjecture that higher-rated and more experienced analysts add more value. The 
adjusted R-squared of 11.8% suggests this model has a reasonable fit. 
In columns (2) through (4), we add proxies for the size of the broker/dealer dropping the stock. 
The larger a broker’s client base, the more investors are potentially directly affected by the 
reduction in information production, so we expect a larger (more negative) market impact. Our size 
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proxies are taken from the annual Factbook of the Securities Industry Association (SIA). While the 
SIA data are standardized, reporting is voluntary and availability of each data item varies across 
brokers. As the size proxies are highly correlated, we include them one at a time. 
As predicted, we find a larger (more negative) announcement effect, the more brokerage 
accounts the broker manages (p=0.021), the greater the value of the brokerage accounts (p=0.01), 
and the larger the broker’s sales force (p=0.052). Each of these effects is economically significant. 
To illustrate, one standard-deviation increases in these three proxies are associated with 10, 18, and 
8 basis points lower (more negative) CARs. Thus, the adverse effect of a coverage termination 
appears to be proportional to the broker’s reach.  
Column (5) separately controls for the size of the retail and institutional sales forces. 
Interestingly, only the size of the retail sales force appears to matter (p=0.003). A one standard 
deviation increase in this variable (say, from Ladenburg, Thalman to Prudential Securities) is 
associated with a 13 basis point lower CAR. The fact that the reach of a broker’s institutional-
investor network appears to have no effect suggests that retail investors are more sensitive to 
changes in research coverage, perhaps because, in contrast to institutions, they typically receive 
research from only one brokerage house. In that case, a coverage termination may reduce their 
demand and hence their valuation for the stock. By contrast, many institutional investors have 
multiple broker relationships and possibly in-house research departments and so are less affected by 
reductions in sell-side research coverage.  
C. Post-termination Return Behavior 
Are these reductions in share prices transitory or persistent? The Fama-French CAR for the 
window [-1,+30] is minus 43 basis points (t = –2.75), indicating there is no bounce back in the 
month after a coverage termination. To investigate share price behavior over the medium-term, we 
estimate standard calendar-time portfolio returns based on buying stocks in month 1 after a 
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coverage termination and selling them in month T, where T = 6, 12, 18, or 24 months. We estimate 
abnormal performance as the intercept (alpha) in OLS regressions of these monthly portfolio returns 
in excess of the riskfree rate on the three Fama-French factors and the Carhart (1997) momentum 
factor. As an alternative to this factor model approach, we also compute style-adjusted portfolio 
returns by subtracting from each sample stock’s monthly return the contemporaneous return on the 
relevant DGTW control portfolio, and weighting stocks in calendar time by the accumulated return 
since their entry into the portfolio. In this case, alpha is estimated as the time series average of the 
monthly time series of style-adjusted portfolio returns. 
Table VI reports the results. For the sample as a whole, the monthly Fama-French-Carhart 
alphas over 6-, 12-, 18-, and 24-month holding periods are 0.50%, 0.29%, 0.27%, and 0.28%, 
respectively. None of these estimates is statistically significant, and they are relatively small 
economically. The DGTW style-adjusted returns are smaller still and they too are statistically 
insignificant. When we split the sample by the extent of prior coverage, we continue to find that 
terminated stocks perform in line with risk and style benchmarks. These findings suggest that the 
announcement-day reductions in share prices shown in Table IV are permanent. Thus, the market 
neither over- nor underreacts to exogenous coverage terminations.  
D. Trading Patterns Around Coverage Terminations 
Coverage terminations are accompanied by abnormally high trading volumes as investors 
rebalance their portfolios. Using CRSP daily volume data, we define abnormal volume as the 
difference between log volume on each day over the window [-5,+10] and average daily log volume 
over a 60-day estimation window ending 10 days before the termination announcement. Figure 2 
plots the daily cross-sectional means of the abnormal changes in volume.  
Trading volume is significantly higher on the announcement day and the day after, when a total 
of 5.9% more shares are traded than in the pre-event window. Volume remains higher than normal 
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for up to nine trading days, with cumulative abnormal volume of 13.0%. Curiously, trading volume 
is 2.8% higher on the day before the announcement (p = 0.02), though this is not accompanied by 
abnormal returns (+26 basis points on average in the market model). 
E. Who Trades? 
Upon announcement of a coverage drop, price falls and trading volume increases. Who trades? 
Absent high-frequency data identifying investors, we use CDA/Spectrum data to compute the 
change in the fraction of the dropped company’s outstanding stock held by institutions required to 
file 13f reports.16 This is computed from the quarter-end before to the quarter-end after a termination 
announcement. Panel A of Table VII shows that 13f institutions as a group increase their holdings 
from 61.7% to 62.5% of shares outstanding following the average termination (p<0.001).  
This increase in institutional holdings could simply reflect broader portfolio trends unrelated to 
terminations, so we compute a difference-in-difference estimator using the control firms described 
in Section I.D. Institutional holdings in control firms are, on average, unchanged around sample 
terminations. The DiD estimate of 0.9% suggests that institutions increase their holdings in stocks 
suffering coverage drops by nearly one percentage points on average, a 1.5% average increase from 
their pre-termination holdings.  
Is this significant? The time clustering of terminations evident in Figure 1 poses a problem for 
standard cross-sectional tests, so we compute p-values based on block bootstraps with 10,000 
replications and Politis and White (2004) block lengths. The bootstrapped p-value indicates that the 
increase in institutional holdings is significant. Thus, 13f institutions are unusually large net buyers 
in the quarter of a termination announcement. By implication, the net sellers are retail investors and 
institutions without a duty to file 13f reports. This echoes our earlier finding that share price 
reductions around coverage terminations are related to the size of the broker’s retail sales force.  
Panel B of Table VII shows a breakdown of the mean net changes in institutional holdings by 
                                                          
16 Investment companies and professional money managers with over $100 million under management are required to 
file quarterly 13f reports. Reports may omit holdings of fewer than 10,000 shares or $200,000 in market value. 
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the number of brokers covering the stock. Proportional institutional holdings increase the most 
when coverage drops to zero, by 3.3%, compared to 1.8% among stocks covered by between one 
and five other analysts.17 The relation between number of brokers and change in institutional 
holdings is broadly monotonic. The differences between orphans and the other four bins are all 
highly significant. These results are consistent with the view that retail investors (and small 
institutional investors) are particularly sensitive to changes in sell-side research coverage. 
IV. Changes in Informational Efficiency 
To test whether sell-side research contributes to informational efficiency, we use three popular 
proxies: The probability of informed trading (PIN), Amihud’s (2002) illiquidity measure, and 
variance ratios. In addition, we examine changes in earnings surprises and return volatilities at 
earnings releases around coverage terminations. We use difference-in-difference estimators to help 
isolate structural breaks in informational efficiency due to terminations, as opposed to random, 
temporary fluctuations in efficiency. For each measure, we test the null that terminations have no 
effect on informational efficiency: DiD = mean [ )()( iGroupControlii prepostprepost −−− ] = 0. 
A. Probability of Informed Trading 
Easley, Kiefer, and O’Hara (1997) propose the probability of informed trading (PIN) as a 
measure of informational efficiency. This is based on the idea that the presence of privately 
informed traders can be noisily inferred from order flow imbalances. One plausible result of 
reduced analyst coverage is that less information for the firm is publicly revealed, leading to an 
increased incidence of investors trading on private information and hence an increase in PIN. 
Using quarterly PIN estimates, we calculate the difference PINt+1 – PINt-1 for both sample and 
control firms, where t denotes the quarter of termination. Estimating PIN can be difficult and 
requires an iterative convergence procedure over a constrained interval. The PIN data we use flags 
                                                          
17 Xu (2006) finds that institutions reduce their ownership of orphaned stocks in a sample that does not screen out 
endogenous terminations. Xu’s finding is consistent with the view that endogenous terminations are implicit sells. 
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potentially problematic estimates (see Brown, Hillegeist, and Lo (2004)). We report results both 
with and without flagged estimates, giving sample sizes of 11,575 and 9,663, respectively.  
Table VIII, Panel A reports the results. The average PIN for sample firms is 0.141 before and 
0.145 after a coverage drop. Subtracting the change in PIN for control firms, the average DiD 
estimate is 0.003, an increase of 2.1% (bootstrapped p-value = 0.011). If we exclude flagged PIN 
estimates, the DiD estimate increases to 0.005 (+3.3%) with a p-value < 0.001.  
This finding suggests that coverage terminations reduce informational efficiency. To illustrate 
its economic magnitude, note that PIN captures transaction costs. Easley et al. (1996) argue that a 
stock’s bid-ask spread should equal about (0.0193 · price · PIN). The average orphaned stock (in 
terms of announcement CAR) has a share price of $27.49 and a bid-ask spread of $0.44 in the 
month before the termination, and its PIN increases by 0.0275 post-termination, net of its control 
group’s PIN change. All else equal, its spread is expected to widen by $0.0146, or about 3.3%.  
B. Liquidity 
Amihud’s (2002) illiquidity measure (AIM) attempts to measure the price impact of trades. In 
more liquid stocks, a trade of given size should have a smaller price impact. AIM is measured as the 
absolute return on a stock divided by the dollar trading volume over a given estimation window. To 
ensure the resulting distributions of levels, changes, and DiD are well-behaved, we follow Amihud 
and rescale AIM as follows: logAIM = ln(106 · average daily AIM over estimation window). 
In the case of AIM, it is particularly important to use a DiD estimator rather than rely on own-
differences. The numerator of AIM is stationary (a return) whereas the denominator is non-
stationary (price · volume). If returns are constant over time but dollar volumes increase, AIM will 
appear to be decreasing, i.e., stocks will appear to become more liquid over time. The DiD estimator 
allows us to test whether sample stocks become more liquid at a slower rate than do control firms, 
i.e., whether they become less liquid in the wake of a coverage termination. 
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Table VIII, Panel B reports the results for three- and six-month estimation windows ending 10 
days before or starting 10 days after a termination announcement. Using a three-month window, 
average logAIM is -8.055 before and -8.086 after a coverage termination, implying that dropped 
stocks became more liquid (less illiquid). The DiD, on the other hand, averages 0.026, implying a 
decrease in liquidity following coverage terminations. The corresponding estimate for the six-month 
window is 0.040. Though relatively small economically, both estimates are statistically significant. 
C. Variance Ratio Tests 
The less informationally efficient a stock, the less rapidly will its price incorporate new 
information, so its return will behave less like a random walk resulting in serial correlation. Under 
the null of a random walk with uncorrelated increments, the variance of returns is a linear function 
of the time interval over which returns are measured (Lo and MacKinlay (1988)), so the ratio of the 
N-day variance to N times the one-day variance equals one. Variance ratios greater (less) than one 
indicate positive (negative) serial correlation. Either indicates a departure from a random walk, so 
we focus on the absolute value of the variance ratio less one, i.e., |VR-1|.  
Table VIII, Panel C reports the results for 2-, 3-, and 4-day returns measured over three- and 
six-month estimation windows. The variance ratios invariably increase following terminations, by 
0.9% to 2.6% on average. This is consistent with reduced informational efficiency.18 
D. Earnings Announcements 
A promising setting in which to observe the consequences of reduced analyst coverage is around 
earnings announcements. As informational efficiency declines, we expect more volatile returns 
around earnings announcements. We also expect greater absolute earnings surprises to the extent 
that post-termination consensus forecasts reflect reduced information sets.19  
Return volatility in the three days around an earnings announcement increases, suggesting that 
                                                          
18 This is the only test in the paper where the subsample of brokerage closure-related terminations generates different 
results. Specifically, the DiD test shows that variance ratios decline around closure-related terminations.  
19 There is no conflict between this hypothesis and the results for earnings surprises shown in Section II. Unlike the 
exogeneity test in Section II, here we use post-termination consensus forecasts and absolute earnings surprises. 
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coverage terminations are associated with more volatile trading around subsequent information 
events. This is consistent with West’s (1988) prediction of larger price reactions to information 
events when the information set shrinks. As Table VIII, Panel D shows, the DiD estimate of the 
change in volatility is +0.049% (p=0.002). This implies an average increase in annualized return 
volatility around earnings announcements from 75.1% pre-termination to 78.8% post-termination. 
As for earnings surprises, the DiD estimate of 0.13 indicates that coverage terminations are 
associated with a 16.9% increase in the average magnitude of earnings surprises (p=0.003). 
E. Summary 
Terminations appear to lead to greater informational asymmetry which increases the risk of 
trading against better-informed investors and hence reduces liquidity. This will have a relatively 
greater effect on a retail investor (who typically bases trading decisions on public information) than 
on an institutional investor (who may have access to other sources of research). This may help 
explain the different reactions of institutional and retail investors found in Section III.  
V. Changes in Expected Returns and Idiosyncratic Volatility  
A. Expected Returns 
Do coverage terminations affect investors’ expected returns? To estimate expected returns, we 
estimate two standard factor models. The market-and-industry model (Roll (1988)) regresses daily 
excess returns (rjit) on the CRSP value-weighted index return (rmt) and the firm’s value-weighted 
Fama-French industry return (rit): jititijmtmjjijit errr +++= ββα . The Fama-French three-factor 
model regresses daily excess returns on rmt and the return difference between small and big stocks 
(SMBt) and high and low book-to-market stocks (HMLt): tjSMBmtmjjjt SMBrr ,ββα ++=  
tjHML HML,β+ jte+ . Regressions are estimated over three- or six-month windows ending 10 days 
before or starting 10 days after the termination announcement. We report the cross-sectional means 
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of the regression coefficients and the average change relative to the style-matched controls. As 
before, p-values are calculated using a block bootstrap. Results are robust to standard thin-trading 
adjustments (Bartholdy and Riding (1994) and Cowan and Sergeant (1996)). 
Table IX reports the results. Market beta decreases significantly in both factor models. For 
instance, in the three-month Fama-French model, average market beta declines from 1.19 to 1.14 
around coverage terminations. The change in the control group is approximately zero, resulting in a 
difference-in-difference estimate of -0.05 (p<0.001). Loadings on the SMB and HML factors, on the 
other hand, increase significantly (in the six-month window), by 0.04 for SMB (p=0.019) and 0.04 
for HML (p=0.060). These findings suggest that dropped stocks become less sensitive to aggregate 
market movements and begin to behave more like small stocks (which tend to be less 
informationally efficient) and like value stocks.  
Combining the six-month Fama-French difference-in-difference estimates with historical mean 
factor returns (calculated over the period from 1963 and 2005, available on Kenneth French’s 
website) suggests that annual expected returns increase by seven basis points, to 14.99%, following 
exogenous coverage terminations. This is commensurate with our point estimates of the 
announcement-day share price falls shown in Table IV. In the Gordon growth model, the percentage 
change in share price equals 1)/()( −−− grgr afterbefore . For g = 2%, 3%, or 4%, the increase in 
expected returns to 14.99% implies share price falls of 54, 58, or 64 basis points.  
B. Volatility Changes 
We next turn to volatility changes. A priori, it is unclear whether coverage terminations increase 
or decrease volatility. Roll (1988) discusses the relation between firm-specific price fluctuations and 
information about fundamentals. He favors the view that high volatility reflects active trading by 
informed arbitrageurs who ensure that stock prices closely reflect fundamental value. In support of 
this view, Durnev et al. (2003) find that firms and industries with greater firm-specific return 
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variation exhibit higher association between current returns and future earnings, suggesting their 
share prices are more informative. On the other hand, reduced information production may increase 
uncertainty and so, possibly, volatility.  
We compute two annualized volatility measures: Raw volatility (based on a stock’s return in 
excess of the riskfree rate), and idiosyncratic volatility (using residuals from the factor models). 
Raw volatility decreases significantly in both estimation windows. Three-month raw volatility 
decreases by 2.3 percentage points. After subtracting the control-group change, the DiD estimate is 
minus 1.39 percentage points (p<0.001), reflecting the fact that firm-specific volatilities have 
generally trended down over the sample period. Over the six-month window, raw volatility falls by 
1.85 percentage points. Idiosyncratic volatilities fall by somewhat larger amounts.  
C. Volatility Trading Strategy 
To illustrate the economic magnitude of the change in volatility around coverage terminations, 
we compute the profits of a trading strategy that takes a short position in a delta-neutral straddle in 
stocks dropped from coverage. Short straddles have positive payoffs if volatility falls. Significant 
returns to this trading strategy would suggest that the option market does not immediately price the 
termination-related decrease in volatility. 
Coval and Shumway (2001) document that short delta-neutral (i.e., zero-beta) straddles generate 
significant returns net of the leverage effect and transactions costs, which they attribute to a 
stochastic volatility factor. As a result, it is doubly important that we compare the straddle returns to 
a benchmark, which we take to be an offsetting (i.e., long) straddle position in options on the 
control stocks. Choosing style-matched control companies, rather than, say, options on the S&P 500 
index, also helps hold transactions costs constant. Appendix A details the construction of the trading 
strategy. We simulate trading at the bid and ask but ignore other transactions costs. 
Short straddles in firms subject to coverage terminations yield average daily returns of 1.36% 
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(p<0.001), consistent with Coval and Shumway (2001). These returns exceed those for the style-
matched controls, which average 1.08% (p<0.001). The average difference of 0.27% per day (6% 
per month) is statistically significant with a bootstrapped p-value of 0.002.  
Short straddles have unlimited downside risk, and the long position in a straddle on control 
stocks is at best an imperfect hedge. An alternative trading strategy is a butterfly, which combines 
the short straddle with an upside and downside hedge (details can be found in Appendix B). The 
short butterfly on terminations yields average daily returns of 2.30% (p<0.001), compared to 2.07% 
for the butterfly on the control stocks. The average net return is 0.23% per day (p=0.018). 
VI. Conclusions 
We quantify the value of sell-side equity research by measuring the change in share price and 
market value of a firm that loses research coverage for exogenous reasons. The exogenous variation 
we exploit is due to structural changes in the research industry following recent regulatory 
interventions and adverse market developments which have caused brokerage firms to downsize 
their research departments and thus drop coverage of thousands of stocks.  
By focusing on firms that lose all analyst coverage, we estimate that the capitalized value to a 
stock-market listed company of receiving sell-side research coverage averages $8.4 million, or 
around 110 basis points of market value. The fact that coverage is valuable helps explain why 
investment banks successfully used promises of coverage when competing for underwriting 
mandates (Ljungqvist, Marston, and Wilhelm (2007)). The fact that there are diminishing returns to 
additional research coverage suggests that these promises were particularly compelling when a 
company starts out without research coverage, such as in an IPO. By linking coverage to investment 
banking work, however implicitly, brokers effectively charged companies for the benefit of 
coverage. The 2003 Global Settlement bans this practice, and not surprisingly banks have scaled 
down their research operations in its wake.  
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An alternative way for brokers to monetize the value of research coverage is to charge 
companies directly, and our estimates suggest that it may be in shareholders’ interest to pay for 
coverage. This model resembles “corporate brokerships” in the U.K.  In the U.S., some smaller 
brokerage firms are experimenting with similar business models, though concerns about the 
independence of credit rating agencies, which have long charged borrowing companies for their 
credit ratings, sound a cautionary note. 
One reason why analyst research is valuable appears to be that it helps improve informational 
efficiency in the stock market. If corporate investment is more efficient when stock prices are more 
informative, as Durnev, Morck, and Yeung (2004) argue, then diminished incentives to produce 
research may have macroeconomic costs. We aim to explore such real consequences of shifts in the 
supply of information in follow-on work. 
Finally, our evidence suggests that individual investors and small institutions may value 
research more highly than do large institutional investors. A plausible explanation is that large 
investors have access to other sources of research (including their own) and so can overcome, or 
even benefit from, declines in informational efficiency, whereas the cost to small investors of 
replicating broker-provided research is, presumably, prohibitive. Thus, the recent regulatory 
interventions aimed at protecting smaller investors may have perverse side-effects, such as 
increasing trading costs and so reducing smaller investors’ stock demands. Whether these side-
effects are offset by gains in investor confidence is another open question for future research. 
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Appendix A: Volatility Trading Strategy - Straddles 
The volatility trading strategy is implemented as follows. To avoid trading options subject to 
event-induced volatility, we establish a short straddle position on trading day +5 after the 
announcement of a coverage termination. Results are robust to using different start dates. We use 
options that have positive open interest, remaining time to maturity of between five and 44 trading 
days, and absolute delta between 0.2 and 0.8 (to ensure we trade at-the-money options). When 
multiple options satisfy these conditions, we choose the one with |∆| closest to 0.5 and maturity 
closest to one month from the trade date. The mean time to maturity is 21 trading days.  
We then take a straddle position consisting of short positions in one put and 
call
put
callw ∆
∆−=  calls, 
which ensures that the straddle has zero delta. The initial proceeds from establishing the short 
straddle are wcall · Premiumcall + Premiumput. We hold the options to maturity (assuming no interim 
dividends for simplicity), at which time we incur a payout of wcall · Payoffcall + Payoffput. The 
continuously compounded daily return on the short straddle is )ln(1
payout
proceeds
TTM
, where TTM is 
time to maturity. The excess return is constructed by subtracting the equivalent straddle return for 
DGTW (1997) style-matched control stocks, constructed as in Section I.D.  
We use OptionMetrics data and evaluate the trading strategy at the bid and ask quotes; investors 
who can trade inside the bid-ask spread will realize greater profits. The number of useable 
observations is 8,264. 
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Appendix B: Volatility Trading Strategy - Butterflies 
The butterfly combines a short straddle (constructed as in Appendix A) with a long out-of-the-
money put (to hedge extreme downside moves, to which short straddles are exposed) and a long 
out-of-the-money call (to hedge upside moves in the underlying). We match the hedge component 
weights to the straddle component weights, i.e., we buy one put and 
call
put
callw ∆
∆−=  calls. All options 
are chosen to have the same maturity as the straddle. We choose calls and puts that are three strike 
prices away from the strike price of the straddle; if these are not available, we use options that are 
two or one strikes away. This gives variable moneyness, so when constructing the butterfly 
positions for style-matched stocks, we match the hedge option moneyness as closely as possible to 
that used for the termination sample stock.  
We apply the same data requirements as in Appendix A. Due to the need for out-of-the-money 
options with open interest, there are fewer tradable butterflies than straddles. The number of useable 
observations is 2,855. 
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Figure 1. Kernel Density Estimate for Termination Clustering  
Smoothed histogram for the concentration of multiple terminations by stock and by broker for the exogenous terminations 
sample, and by stock for the Reuters universe over the period 2000-2005. 
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Figure 2. Percentage Change in Trading Volume Around Termination Announcements 
The figure reports the mean percentage increase in daily trading volume for event window [-5,+10] around a coverage 
termination. Abnormal volume is estimated as the difference between log volume on each event day and average log 
volume over a 60-day estimation window ending ten days before the event. Day 0 denotes the event day. Black bars signify 
that the change is significant at the 5% level, based on p-values calculated using a block bootstrap with block length chosen 
according to the optimality criterion of Politis and White (2004). 
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Table I. Research Coverage Terminations: Summary Statistics.  
The sample consists of 16,253 coverage terminations (though the sample size varies depending on the availability of variables of interest). This table reports 
summary statistics for the market value of equity, share turnover (monthly volume divided by shares outstanding), daily return volatility, and the extent of coverage 
for each stock in the terminations sample; the CRSP universe (share codes 10 and 11); the universe of stocks in the Reuters analyst coverage database; and the 
universe of stocks in the I/B/E/S forecast database. For each firm in the terminations sample, we calculate equity value and turnover in the month prior to the first 
termination date. For CRSP, these are first computed as monthly averages for 2002 (the midpoint of our sample period) firm-by-firm and then averaged cross-
sectionally. Annualized volatility for terminations is the standard deviation of daily continuously compounded returns in the six-month period ending one month 
prior to a termination, times √252. CRSP, I/B/E/S, and Reuters volatilities are the annualized daily standard deviations for firms in these samples during calendar 
year 2002; we exclude firms with fewer than 200 nonmissing return observations. The number of brokers covering a stock in our terminations sample over the year 
prior to the drop is based on combining data from the Reuters and I/B/E/S datasets. The broker count for the Reuters universe represents the number of unique 
brokers that covered each stock in the Reuters sample during calendar year 2002. Similarly, the I/B/E/S count represents the number of brokers that published 
research on a given firm in I/B/E/S at least once during 2002. The broker counts are then averaged cross-sectionally. All pairwise differences are statistically 
significant.  
 
   Terminations  CRSP  Reuters  I/B/E/S    Combined Reuters-I/B/E/S  
      sample universe   universe   universe     intersection union   
Equity market value (previous year)            
    Mean    3,613.8 2,197.2 5,115.2 3,299.1 5,244.6 3,254.5  
    Median    450.5 145.8 730.9 396.6 765.0 384.8  
    Range    2.0 – 602,433  3.0 – 369,002  3.4 – 369,002  0.9 – 369,002  8.7 – 369,002  0.9 – 369,002  
Monthly turnover (previous year)           
    Mean    0.17  0.11  0.18  0.15  0.18  0.14  
    Median    0.10  0.06  0.12  0.10  0.12  0.09  
    Range    0 – 9.23  0 – 2.96  0 – 2.86  0 – 2.86  0 – 2.86  0 – 2.86  
Daily return volatility (annualized %)           
    Mean    65.5  71.8  62.4  64.8  61.7  65.2  
    Median    56.1  58.9  52.8  55.4  52.4  55.6  
    Range    11.5 – 332.2  5.4 – 606.0  5.4 – 246.1  5.4 – 519.3  5.4 – 246.1  5.4 – 519.3  
Number of brokers covering stock (previous year)           
    Mean    9.5    8.7  7.5  9.5  8.2  
    Median    7.0    6.0  5.0  6.0  5.0  
    Range      1 – 52    1 – 138  1 – 89  1 – 138  1 – 138   
               
Number of firms  4,150  5,796  2,164  3,771  2,107  3,827  
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Table II. Sample Breakdown by Extent of Prior Coverage. 
The table reports a breakdown of the terminations sample by the number of other brokers covering the stock in the six 
months preceding the coverage termination (based on pooling data from Reuters Estimates and I/B/E/S). We refer to stocks 
in bin 0 as ‘orphaned’ stocks. We report mean and median equity market value (as of the month prior to the termination) 
and the mean DGTW (1997) quintiles to which sample companies are assigned. DGTW sort stocks in the CRSP/Compustat 
universe into size, book-to-market, and momentum quintiles, based on their characteristics in June of a given year. 
Quintiles are numbered from 1 (small size/low book-to-market/low prior return) to 5 (large/high book-to-market/high prior 
return). We map sample companies to DGTW quintiles as of the June prior to a termination. 
 
 
# of other brokers 
covering the stock   Equity market value ($m)  Mean DGTW quintiles 
bin 
in the prior 6 
months 
No. of 
obs.  mean median  size 
book-to- 
market momentum 
          
All - 16,253  8,085.2 1,217.4  3.1 2.5 2.9 
          
0 0 838  1,412.2 79.4  1.5 2.6 2.9 
1 1-5 4,031  740.9 288.4  1.8 2.4 3.0 
2 6-10 3,783  1,872.3 884.0  2.7 2.5 3.0 
3 11-15 2,866  5,428.2 2,196.2  3.6 2.7 2.8 
4 >15 4,735  22,090.6 7,365.0  4.4 2.6 2.8 
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Table III. Choice Model of Sector Terminations. 
We investigate the empirical determinants of which sectors a brokerage firm chooses to drop using a McFadden (1974) 
choice model. The choice set includes all sectors the broker covers at the time of the decision, and brokers are assumed to 
select those sectors whose termination will maximize their expected utility (i.e., profit). The unit of observation is hence a 
broker-sector pair. The model is estimated using probit with or without random brokerage-firm effects. The dependent 
variable equals one if a sector is chosen for termination and zero otherwise. Sectors are defined using six-digit GICS codes 
and sector terminations are identified from the Reuters coverage table described in Section I. Cases where a broker quits 
equity research (i.e., terminates every sector) are excluded. The explanatory variables are defined as follows. Prior and 
future sector performance are measured as market-adjusted cumulative returns in the sector over the twelve months before 
and after the decision date, using the CRSP value-weight index. Prior and future sector earnings surprises are measured as 
realized quarterly earnings minus consensus (i.e., median) forecasts and scaled by book value of equity, averaged over the 
prior or next four quarters and across stocks in the same GICS code. Return volatility is measured over the prior twelve 
months and averaged across stocks in the same GICS. We also control for the log of one plus the number of other brokers 
covering the sector during the six months preceding the coverage termination; a dummy set equal to one if the analyst 
covering the sector was ranked first, second, or third in his sector in the annual Institutional Investor all-star rankings (as of 
the October issue preceding the termination); and the log of one plus the number of years the analyst has contributed 
forecasts to I/B/E/S. (For analyst teams, we compute the maximum ranking and experience across team members, though 
our results are not sensitive to this coding.) Standard errors are clustered within brokerage firms to reduce the influence of 
overlapping observations. We use ***, **, and * to denote significance at the 0.1%, 1%, and 5% level (two-sided), 
respectively. In addition to probit coefficients, we report marginal effects as well as economic effects (i.e., marginal effects 
times a one-standard deviation change in continuous covariates). 
 
Dependent variable =1 if broker drops sector, = 0 otherwise 
Coefficient
Marginal 
effect
Marginal 
effect Coefficient 
Marginal 
effect
Marginal 
effect
 s.e. (dF/dx) times s.d. s.e. (dF/dx) times s.d.
Sector characteristics        
Market-adjusted return prior 12 months -0.011 -0.001 -0.001 -0.002 0.000 0.000
 0.063 0.052 
Market-adjusted return next 12 months -0.024 -0.003 -0.001 0.049 0.008 0.002
 0.074 0.076 
Average earnings surprise prior 4 quarters -0.056 -0.007 -0.004 -0.049 -0.008 -0.005
 0.034 0.035 
Average earnings surprise next 4 quarters 0.047 0.006 0.003 0.068 0.011 0.006
 0.039 0.039 
Return volatility prior 12 months -0.867* -0.102 -0.007 -1.211*** -0.200 -0.014
 0.420 0.347 
No. of other brokers covering the sector -0.058 -0.007 -0.004 -0.143*** -0.024 -0.013
 0.039 0.040 
Analyst characteristics   
=1 if one or more team members are II ‘all-stars’ -0.765*** -0.074 -0.074 -0.616*** -0.088 -0.088
 0.066 0.072 
log analyst seniority -0.123*** -0.015 -0.009 -0.114*** -0.019 -0.012
 0.034   0.032   
Diagnostics       
Brokerage-firm random effects No   Yes   
Chi-square test of random effects = 0 n.a.   138.3***   
Wald-test: all coef. = 0 184.9***   133.0***   
Observed probability 0.071   0.071   
Pseudo-R2 5.2 %   7.9 %   
No. of observations 9,811   9,811   
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Table IV. Abnormal Returns Around Terminations of Analyst Coverage.  
We compute abnormal returns over three different windows using two separate benchmarks: The market model and the 
Fama-French three-factor model. (Results are nearly identical if we include a Carhart (1997) momentum factor in the 
Fama-French model.) We use the CRSP value-weighted index to proxy for the market return. We report these abnormal 
return metrics for the overall sample (Panel A) as well as broken down by the number of other brokers covering the stock in 
the six months preceding the coverage termination (Panel B) and by termination year (Panel C). To correct for after-hours 
announcements, we use time stamps to determine the first trading day after the announcement where available. Abnormal 
returns are in percent. We report test statistics that control for event-induced variance changes. For the market model 
abnormal returns, we report both the parametric Boehmer, Musumeci, and Poulsen (1991) standardized cross-sectional test 
and Cowan’s (1992) non-parametric generalized sign test statistic (separated by “/”). For the Fama-French model, we report 
Brown and Warner’s (1980) “crude dependence adjustment” t-test and the generalized sign test (separated by “/”).  We use 
***, **, and * to denote significance at the 0.1%, 1%, and 5% level (two-sided), respectively. The sample falls short of 16,253 
because we require 50 trading days of pre-event stock prices to estimate the model parameters. 
 
Estimation window:  
Close on day before termination to … bin 
# of other 
brokers covering 
the stock in the 
prior 6 months 
No. of 
obs. 
 
Market model  
Fama-French 
three-factor 
model 
          
Panel A: All terminations          
… close on day of termination [-1,0]   16,205  -0.50 ***/***  -0.47 ***/*** 
… close on day +1   [-1,+1]   16,205  -0.55 ***/***  -0.54 ***/*** 
… close on day +3   [-1,+3]   16,205  -0.67 ***/***  -0.64  **/*** 
          
Panel B: Terminations by number of brokers covering the stock 
… close on day of termination [-1,0] 0 0 822  -0.90 ***/***  -0.90 ***/*** 
 1 1-5 4,009  -0.70 ***/***  -0.65 ***/*** 
 2 6-10 3,777  -0.52 ***/***  -0.49 ***/*** 
 3 11-15 2,863  -0.43 ***/***  -0.42 ***/*** 
 4 >15 4,734  -0.27 ***/***  -0.27   **/*** 
… close on day +1   [-1,+1] 0 0 822  -1.08 ***/***  -1.10 ***/*** 
 1 1-5 4,009  -0.64 ***/***  -0.62 ***/*** 
 2 6-10 3,777  -0.55 ***/***  -0.52 ***/*** 
 3 11-15 2,863  -0.52 ***/***  -0.52 ***/*** 
 4 >15 4,734  -0.40 ***/***  -0.41 ***/*** 
… close on day +3   [-1,+3] 0 0 822  -1.31 ***/***  -1.38 ***/*** 
 1 1-5 4,009  -0.67 ***/*  -0.65 ***/** 
 2 6-10 3,777  -0.63 ***/***  -0.57 ***/** 
 3 11-15 2,863  -0.76 ***/***  -0.72 ***/*** 
 4 >15 4,734  -0.53 ***/***  -0.50   **/*** 
                
 
 38
Table IV. Continued.  
 
Estimation window:  
Close on day before termination to …  Year 
No. of 
obs. 
 
Market model  
Fama-French 
three-factor 
model 
          
Panel C: Terminations by year 
… close on day of termination [-1,0]  2000 1,949  -0.65 ***/**  -0.62 ***/*** 
  2001 1,778  -0.55 ***/***  -0.54 ***/*** 
  2002 3,859  -0.94 ***/***  -0.82 ***/*** 
  2003 2,963  -0.23   **/**  -0.32   **/*** 
  2004 2,724  -0.32 ***/***  -0.23   **/*** 
  2005 2,932  -0.23 ***/***  -0.25 ***/*** 
… close on day +1   [-1,+1]  2000 1,949  -0.73 ***/***  -0.67 ***/*** 
  2001 1,778  -0.62 ***/**  -0.59   **/*** 
  2002 3,859  -1.13 ***/***  -1.06 ***/*** 
  2003 2,963  -0.12     */  -0.26      /** 
  2004 2,724  -0.25 ***/***  -0.21    */*** 
  2005 2,932  -0.34 ***/***  -0.33 ***/*** 
… close on day +3   [-1,+3]  2000 1,949  -0.50     */  -0.53    */ 
  2001 1,778  -0.40 ***/*  -0.43      /* 
  2002 3,859  -1.66 ***/***  -1.46 ***/*** 
  2003 2,963  -0.23     */  -0.44     */*** 
  2004 2,724  -0.38 ***/***  -0.28     */ 
  2005 2,932  -0.35 ***/**  -0.28     */** 
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Table V. Cross-sectional Determinants of Market Reaction to Coverage Terminations.  
We estimate ordinary least-squares regressions with Fama-French-adjusted cumulative abnormal returns around coverage 
terminations as the dependent variable. All regressions include firm fixed effects (using CRSP permnos) and 
announcement-year effects. These are jointly significant and not reported. We control for the log of one plus the number of 
other brokers covering the stock during the six months preceding the coverage termination; a dummy set equal to one if the 
analyst dropping the stock was ranked first, second, or third in his sector in the annual Institutional Investor all-star 
rankings (as of the October issue preceding the termination); the log of one plus the number of years the analyst has 
contributed forecasts to I/B/E/S; the log of the company’s equity market value (as of the month before termination); and 
five proxies for the size of the broker/dealer dropping the stock. The size proxies are taken from standardized, self-reported 
submissions to the annual Factbook of the Securities Industry and Financial Markets Association (formerly the Securities 
Industry Association). These data are as of January 1 of the termination year. The number of observations used in each 
regression depends on data availability for each proxy for broker/dealer size, as reported in the Factbook. RR stands for 
registered representative, i.e., an employee of a broker/dealer who is licensed to sell securities to either retail or institutional 
investors. Heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors are reported in italics beneath the coefficient estimates. We use ***, 
**, and * to denote significance at the 0.1%, 1%, and 5% level (two-sided), respectively.  
 
 Dependent variable: Fama-French CAR [-1,0], in % 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) 
      
log no. of other brokers 0.352** 0.543*** 0.401 0.342** 0.542*** 
 0.115 0.148 0.275 0.137 0.146 
=1 if analyst is II ‘all-star’ -0.261 -0.283 -0.518 -0.196 -0.254 
 0.136 0.172 0.297 0.154 0.174 
log analyst seniority -0.133** -0.191** -0.278* -0.185*** -0.143* 
 0.051 0.063 0.120 0.064 0.062 
log equity market value -0.192 -0.331** -0.380 -0.221 -0.354** 
 0.107 0.121 0.240 0.126 0.129 
Broker/deal size proxy      
log no. of customer accounts  -0.041*    
  0.018    
log value of customer accounts   -0.077*   
   0.033   
log no. of RRs    -0.040*  
    0.021  
log no. of retail RRs     -0.040** 
     0.014 
log no. of institutional RRs     -0.005 
     0.022 
      
Adjusted R-squared 11.8 % 14.4 % 7.1 % 12.0 % 13.1 % 
Wald test: all coef. = 0 6.8*** 4.3*** 2.6** 5.6*** 4.0*** 
No. of observations 15,972 11,192   5,445 12,893 11,592 
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Table VI. Post-termination Return Behavior. 
We estimate standard calendar-time portfolio returns based on buying stocks in month 1 after a coverage termination and 
selling them in month T, where T = 6, 12, 18, or 24 months. To estimate abnormal performance, we regress monthly 
portfolio returns in excess of the riskfree rate on the three Fama-French factors and the Carhart (1997) momentum factor. 
We report only the intercept, which is an estimate of abnormal performance (alpha), and heteroskedasticity-consistent t-
statistics. Alternatively, we compute monthly style-adjusted portfolio returns by subtracting from each sample stock’s 
monthly return the contemporaneous return on the relevant DGTW (1997) control portfolio, and weighting stocks in 
calendar time by the accumulated return since their entry into the portfolio. In this case, abnormal performance is estimated 
as the time-series average of the monthly time series of style-adjusted portfolio returns, and the reported t-statistic is 
computed from the standard deviation of the time-series returns. None of the alphas or style-adjusted returns is statistically 
significant at the 5% level or better.  
 
 
# of other 
brokers   
Monthly Fama-French-Carhart  
alphas (in %) over T months  
Monthly DGTW  
style-adjusted returns (in %) 
bin 
covering the 
stock in the 
prior 6 months 
No. of 
obs.  T=6  T=12 T=18 T=24  T=6  T=12 T=18 T=24 
             
Panel A: All terminations (in %) 
All  16,253  0.50 0.29 0.27 0.28 0.36 0.33 0.22 0.14 
    2.03 1.37 1.30 1.36 1.56 1.60 1.14 0.75 
            
Panel B: Terminations by number of brokers covering the stock (in %) 
0 0 838  0.44 0.34 0.32 0.25 1.17 1.19 0.59 0.20 
    0.78 0.89 0.87 0.69 1.34 1.97 1.10 0.38 
1 1-5 4,031  0.16 0.17 0.11 0.11 0.31 0.41 0.28 0.15 
    0.70 0.74 0.49 0.47 1.29 2.03 1.59 0.87 
2 6-10 3,783  0.58 0.24 0.23 0.27 0.36 0.24 0.14 0.07 
    2.13 1.11 1.17 1.38 1.46 1.08 0.68 0.36 
3 11-15 2,866  0.60 0.39 0.39 0.42 0.37 0.26 0.09 0.03 
    1.96 1.59 1.65 1.74 1.39 1.12 0.44 0.13 
4 >15 4,735  0.67 0.37 0.35 0.37 0.26 0.23 0.21 0.22 
    1.67 1.03 1.03 1.14 0.78 0.80 0.80 0.88 
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Table VII. Changes in 13f Holdings Around Coverage Terminations.  
The table reports the quarterly change in institutional investors’ holdings of stocks that experience coverage terminations. 
We report the mean fraction of total stock outstanding that is held in aggregate by institutional investors filing 13f reports in 
the quarter before and the quarter after a termination as well as the average change relative to a control group (‘mean DiD’). 
For each sample termination, a control group is formed by randomly selecting five stocks with the same DGTW (1997) 
style benchmark assignment in the June prior to a termination, subject to the condition that control firms did not themselves 
experience a coverage termination in the quarter before and after the event. We then calculate a difference-in-difference 
test, DiD = )()( iGroupControlii prepostprepost −−− , that is, the difference between the pre- and post-termination change for 
sample stock i less the average change for the five control group stocks. We also report percentage changes (DiD/mean 
before – 1). Panel A reports these statistics for the entire sample of coverage terminations. Panel B provides a breakdown of 
the terminations sample by the number of other brokers covering the stock in the six months preceding the coverage 
termination. 13f data is taken from Thomson Financial’s CDA/Spectrum database. We lose 1,395 events involving stocks 
that do not satisfy DGTW’s data conditions and 1,177 events with missing 13f data for either the sample firm or the 
controls. (The ‘own’ changes can be computed for 16,202 of the 16,253 sample events. The patterns for this larger set of 
events mirror those shown in the table.) To adjust for potential cross-sectional dependence due to overlapping estimation 
windows, p-values for the difference-in-difference tests are calculated using a block bootstrap (with optimal block length 
chosen according to the optimality criterion of Politis and White (2004)). Significance levels of ‘own’-difference test 
statistics (posti – prei) are similar (not reported). 
 
 
# of other 
brokers 
covering the 
stock in the   Terminations  Control group       
 prior 6 No. of  Before After  Before After  Mean  p-value  Percentage 
bin months obs.   drop drop   drop drop   DiD   DiD = 0   change 
               
Panel A: All terminations (in %) 
All  13,681  61.7 62.5  54.8 54.6  0.9  0.000  1.5% 
               
Panel B: Terminations by number of brokers covering the stock (in %) 
0 0 622  30.5 30.9  30.7 30.2  1.0  0.000  3.3% 
1 1-5 3,222  51.1 52.0  40.8 40.8  0.9  0.000  1.8% 
2 6-10 3,226  65.8 66.4  56.4 56.3  0.8  0.000  1.2% 
3 11-15 2,483  68.3 69.0  61.9 61.8  0.8  0.000  1.2% 
4 >15 4,128  67.5 68.4  65.3 65.1  1.0  0.000  1.5% 
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Table VIII. Changes in Informational Efficiency for Individual Stocks.  
The table reports changes in three measures of informational efficiency around coverage terminations. For each measure, 
we report cross-sectional means before and after a termination and the average change relative to a control group. We then 
calculate a difference-in-difference test relative to a control group (formed as in Table VII), that is, the difference between 
the pre- and post-termination change for sample stock i less the average change for the control group stocks: DiD 
= )()( iGroupControlii prepostprepost −−− . We also report percentage changes (DiD/mean before – 1). Panel A reports the 
mean probability of informed trading for stocks in the termination sample in the quarters immediately preceding and 
following the quarter in which the coverage termination occurred. We use Stephen Brown’s quarterly PIN estimates, which 
include an indicator variable flagging possible estimation imprecision. Case 1 includes all terminations for which PIN 
estimates are available, regardless of the value of the estimation flag (a total of 11,574 observations); case 2 includes only 
observations with unflagged PIN estimates (a total of 9,663 observations). Panel B reports the mean of the log Amihud 
illiquidity measure, defined as the natural log of the ratio of the stock return to the dollar trading volume and scaled by 106. 
This and the next statistic are computed over three-month and six-month windows ending 10 days prior to the termination 
announcement or starting 10 days after the announcement date. Panel C reports the mean of stock return variance ratios, 
defined as the N-day return variance divided by N times the one day variance, using N = 2, 3, or 4. Panel D reports the 
effects of termination on quarterly earnings announcements. The first measure is the return volatility (in %) in a three-day 
window around earnings announcements for all announcements occurring in a one-year window before and after the drop. 
The second measure is the mean absolute value of quarterly earnings surprises in a one-year window before and after the 
drop. A surprise is defined as the absolute value of actual quarterly earnings minus the latest I/B/E/S consensus estimate 
before the earnings announcement, scaled by book value of equity. Earnings surprise cannot be computed for orphaned 
stocks. To adjust for potential cross-sectional dependence due to overlapping estimation windows, p-values for the 
difference-in-difference tests are calculated using a block bootstrap (with optimal block length chosen according to the 
optimality criterion of Politis and White (2004)). Significance levels of ‘own’-difference test statistics (posti – prei) are 
similar (not reported). 
 
     Terminations  Control group       
     Before   After  Before  After  Mean  p-value  Percentage 
          drop   drop   drop   drop   DiD   DiD = 0   change 
Panel A: PIN estimator             
 Case 1  0.141 0.145 0.157 0.158 0.003 0.011 2.1% 
 Case 2  0.148 0.154 0.164 0.165 0.005 0.000 3.3% 
Panel B: Amihud illiquidity             
 3-month window -8.055 -8.086 -7.551 -7.609 0.026 0.003 0.3% 
 6-month window -8.515 -8.580 -7.897 -8.002 0.040 0.002 0.5% 
Panel C: Variance ratios             
N=2                
 3-month window 0.119 0.120 0.147 0.146 0.003 0.022 2.1% 
 6-month window 0.095 0.094 0.137 0.134 0.003 0.024 2.6% 
N=3           
 3-month window 0.171 0.172 0.204 0.203 0.002 0.307 0.9% 
 6-month window 0.135 0.133 0.183 0.179 0.003 0.046 2.1% 
N=4           
 3-month window 0.210 0.210 0.244 0.241 0.003 0.220 1.2% 
 6-month window 0.162 0.160 0.212 0.207 0.004 0.024 2.3% 
Panel D: Earnings announcements           
 Volatility (in %) 2.684 2.545 1.712 1.525 0.049 0.002 1.8% 
 Earnings surprise 0.770 0.970 0.770 0.840 0.130 0.003 16.9% 
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Table IX. Changes in Risk Around Termination of Analyst Coverage. 
The table reports systematic and variance risk measures computed separately before and after a coverage termination. We regress daily excess returns on two 
alternative sets of factors: 1) Returns on the CRSP value-weighted index and the firm’s value-weighted Fama-French industry, . 2) 
The Fama-French three-factor model, . Results are robust to standard thin-trading adjustments. Coefficients are 
estimated over three- or six-month windows ending 10 days prior to the termination announcement or starting 10 days after the announcement. We report the cross-
sectional means of the regression coefficients. We then calculate a difference-in-difference test relative to a control group (formed as in Table VII), DiD 
=
jititijmtmjjijit errr +++= ββα
jttjHMLtjSMBmtmjjjt eHMLSMBrr ++++= ,, βββα
)i()( −−− . We also report mean annualized return volatility (daily volatility times √252), in %. Raw volatility is defined as the 
standard deviation of the firm’s daily returns over the estimation window while idiosyncratic volatility is the standard deviation of the fitted residuals for each model 
over a given window. To adjust for potential cross-sectional dependence due to overlapping estimation windows, p-values for the DiD tests are calculated using a 
block bootstrap (with optimal block length chosen according to the optimality criterion of Politis and White (2004)). Significance levels of own-difference test 
statistics (posti – prei) are similar (not reported). 
GroupControlii prepostprepost
 
Market-industry model  Fama-French three-factor model 
  Before After   DiD p-value    Before After   DiD p-value 
Panel A: Three-month estimation window         
Mean market beta 1.18 1.15 -0.05 0.000  Mean market beta 1.19 1.14 -0.05 0.000 
Mean industry beta 0.37 0.37 0.02 0.064  Mean SMB beta 0.65 0.68 0.03 0.110 
      Mean HML beta 0.14 0.11 -0.01 0.592 
Mean idiosyncratic volatility 44.0 42.2 -1.56 0.000   Mean idiosyncratic volatility 43.5 41.9 -1.61 0.000 
Mean raw volatility 51.2 48.9 -1.39 0.000       
           
Panel B: Six-month estimation window         
Mean market beta 1.18 1.16 -0.05 0.000  Mean market beta 1.18 1.14 -0.04 0.005 
Mean industry beta 0.37 0.37 -0.01 0.092  Mean SMB beta 0.70 0.73 0.04 0.019 
      Mean HML beta 0.14 0.11 0.04 0.060 
Mean idiosyncratic volatility 46.3 43.3 -2.03 0.000   Mean idiosyncratic volatility 46.0 43.0 -2.16 0.000 
Mean raw volatility 52.8 49.2 -1.85 0.000       
  
 
